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Abstract:  The field of gender and development has been marked in recent years by extensive debates about the shortfalls of 
gender mainstreaming and the depoliticisation of gender and other concepts in development praxis. In these discussions 
considerably less thought has been given to the theoretical premises of these concepts and the implications of their interface with 
the epistemological and normative systems of the diverse communities in which they are employed. In the current paper I hope to 
undertake a more theoretical project by delineating how three foundational conceptsgender, gender equality, and 
empowermentare directly linked to secular epistemologies and western gender metaphysics, to suggest how this might be 
interfering with effective gender and development practice in non-western/non-secular contexts. I propose that more effort may 
need to be put in reconstructing and theorising gender realities through local conceptual repertoires in order to better design 
gender interventions that are attuned to local normative systems.  
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Introduction: In recent years the field of gender and 
development has engaged extensively in a critique of 
gender mainstreaming.
1
 Many prominent scholars have 
argued that „gender‟ has been extensively depoliticised, 
misunderstood, or co-opted since its mainstreaming at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 
1995  (Cornwall, Harrison and Whitehead 2007; Wong 
and Mukhopadhyay 2007; Bryan and Varat 2008; Moser 
2014). Some seminal contributions have detailed 
illuminating genealogies on how „gender‟, „gender 
mainstreaming‟, and the associated concept of 
„empowerment‟ have been deployed by bureaucrats, 
organisational staff, and practitioners over time to result 
in „development speak‟ stripped of original theoretical 
implications (Smyth 2010; Batliwala 2010). Two Gender 
and Development issues (2005 and 2012) that were also 
dedicated to gender mainstreaming confirmed the same 
problematic patterns (Porter and Sweetman 2005; 
Sweetman 2012, Mannell 2012; Sandler and Rao 2012; 
Moser and Moser 2005).  
 
The extensive analysis on gender discourse at the 
institutional and organisational level (Arnfred 2001: 81-
82; Mukhopadhyay and Wong 2007: 12) is striking when 
compared to the limited discussion of the epistemological 
implications of mainstream gender discourse in non-
western/non-secular contexts. In the aforementioned 
Gender and Development issues a few mentioned 
concerns of incommensurability between the gender 
ideals of the Beijing agenda and the gender realities, 
norms, expectations, and constraints of men and women 
at the local level (Porter and Sweetman 2005: 4; Wendoh 
and Wallace 2005). How gender practitioners should 
account for local religio-cultural cosmologies
2
 in gender 
analysis, theorisation, and sensitisation cross-culturally 
has not been systematically problematized in the existing 
literature however. And while religio-cultural parameters 
have been increasingly integrated in gender and 
development studies in many nuanced ways,
3
 the findings 
of such empirical studies do not appear to have led to a 
reconsideration of conceptual frameworks and theoretical 
assumptions still espoused widely in the field of gender 
and development (see also Tomalin 2007: 1). It is also 
notable that the field has conventionally given 
prominence to theorisations that have stressed religio-
cultural institutions as loci of female subordination 
(Whitehead 2006 [1979]; Moser 1993; Baden and Goetz 
1997; Kabeer 1999b; Momsen 2004; Cornwall 2016). 
 
In this paper I want to propose that some of the postulated 
shortfalls of gender and development may trace to the 
epistemological underpinnings of mainstream concepts 
used in the field. My proposition is that these concepts, 
by default of being theorised and reworked within a 
predominantly secular framework, are attuned primarily 
to western gender metaphysics and may foundationally 
conflict with local belief systems of gender. I will suggest 
that non-secular epistemologies may need to be given a 
more central position in gender and development 
theorisation, and to be integrated into “a methodology of 
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analysis, evaluation and practice” (Bradley 2011: 25) as a 
way to improving the relevance and effectiveness of 
gender sensitisation and programming in these non-
western/non-secular contexts. 
 
Conceptual and theoretical underpinnings: The gender 
mainstreaming literature includes various examples in 
which local women and men found „gender‟ to be alien to 
their language and culture, or threatening to their 
religious beliefs (Abu-Habib 2007: 55; Vouhé 2007: 64; 
Para-Mallam et al. 2011). After assessing the reasons 
behind the hesitation of some NGOs in Africa to engage 
with gender equality discourse, Senorina Wendoh and 
Tina Wallace noted for example that “Religious faith and 
traditional cultural values are important in communities” 
but “these are not easily reconciled with the current 
concepts of gender equality imported from international 
agencies and donors” (Wendoh and Wallace 2005: 76). In 
their detailed study of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) domestication process in Nigeria, 
Oluwafunmilayo Para-Mallam and co-authors 
interviewed men and women who expressed objections to 
the ideal of gender equality, citing religio-cultural 
alternatives (Para-Mallam et al. 2011). Similar objections 
were noted for gender trainings in the Francophone world 
(Vouhé 2007: 64). While examining possible causes for 
such reactions, authors have tended to emphasise the local 
realities and politics, the terminological foreignness of 
„gender‟, or unsuitable pedagogical methods for 
sensitisation, but have given less consideration to the 
conceptual and theoretical incommensurability that these 
objections implied in the contexts they studied. 
 
The case of the CEDAW domestication process in 
Nigeria, which was analysed extensively in a study by the 
Religions and Development (RaD) programme of the 
University of Birmingham, is worth a closer examination. 
The report makes evident that the language of gender 
equality in the CEDAW document was perceived to 
contradict religio-cultural gender norms, such as related 
to marriage among Muslim believers, or normative values 
such as exemplified in the opposition to abortion among 
Christian believers. Considerable objections were also 
raised by women and men who valued theological gender 
metaphysics and believed in the potential of their 
religious traditions to promote human dignity without 
resorting to imported concepts and rights frameworks. 
The authors mentioned, for instance, Ruth who 
questioned the need for western ideals of equality on the 
premise of theological explanations that grounded man-
woman equality in the divine creation (Para-Mallam et al. 
2011: 18). Androcentric objections to CEDAW fuelled by 
selfish or ideological interest to secure the continuation of 
girls‟ and women‟s abuse can never be justified and were 
rightly contested, but it is important that objections citing 
religio-cultural worldviews be given careful consideration. 
This is because I believe that they point to potentially 
fundamental incompatibilities between local gender 
metaphysics and the key gender theories and concepts in 
the field.  
 
In what follows I first discuss the theoretical genealogy of 
gender with recourse to feminist thought and some key 
conceptualisations of gender equality and empowerment 
within gender and development scholarship, prior to 
attempting to outline what these epistemological 
limitations may be. While this article aims to reach 
gender and development theorists and practitioners, 
recourse to some feminist philosophical 
conceptualisations is necessary in order to trace the 
epistemological and theoretical underpinnings of 
mainstream concepts employed also in development 
discourse. These feminist theorisations are neither 
exhaustive nor conclusive; however, they have been 
especially influential in the formation of foundational 
concepts and gender analytical frameworks and are thus 
selected for discussion.  
 
‘Gender’: Gender was introduced within development 
discourse to differentiate the socially constructed status, 
roles, and responsibilities of men and women from their 
biologically sexed anatomies (Whitehead 1979; Moser 
2014: 6). Gender was conceived as a vector of inequality 
to draw attention to processes by which the biology of the 
sexed subject is transformed into social relations of 
inequality (Kabeer 1994: 65). As the product of the 
women‟s movement in Euro-America it entered the field 
of development studies under Marxist discourse at a time 
that feminist-minded development practitioners started to 
preoccupy with the exclusion of women from economic 
advancement (Kabeer 1994: 23, 50). Gradually, attention 
was transferred from capitalism and colonialism as forces 
of human oppression to sexed bodies and the ways in 
which this biology was interlinked with ideas of 
femininity and masculinity to result in women‟s 
economic, professional, and social disadvantage. In this 
way, the notion of social construction progressively 
extended beyond status, roles, valuations, and relations to 
subsume women‟s and men‟s subjectivities/identities 




Such theoretical progressions must be traced to feminist 
philosophy, and especially western theories of gender 
metaphysicsbroadly defined here as theories of the 
origins, expressions, and aetiologies of gender, especially 
in relation to sex. The common understanding is that 
„gender‟ was appropriated by the feminist movement in 
the 1960s from psychology,
5
 and it was employed to 
signify the mutable, socially defined attributes and roles 
of men and women, while „sex‟ was reserved to describe 
the female and male biology (Friedman 2006). According 
to Christine Delphy, the progression from sex to sex roles 
and ultimately to gender was strategic and aimed to 
„denaturalise‟ the social woman (Delphy 2001: 418). In 
early conceptualisations the implication was generally 
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that gender was grounded on sex, what Linda Nicholson 
has seminally called „biological foundationalism‟ 
(Nicholson 1994). Gayle Rubin, for example, in a seminal 
1975 paper referred to the „gender/sex system‟ which she 
conceived as “a set of arrangements by which a society 
transforms biological sexuality into products of human 
activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are 
satisfied” (1975: 159). This summarised her perception 
that female oppression is a product of a pre-existing 
normative framework, perpetuated in kinship systems, 
which gendered people by their sexed bodies. By recourse 
to psychology, Rubin was also the one to integrate more 
explicitly sexuality into gender, linking heteronormativity 
to a pre-existing patriarchal status quo. She called for „a 
genderless (but not sexless) society‟ which meant that 
individuals would continue to be seen as anatomically 
different but this anatomy would not determine their 
sexuality, identities, positions, and behaviours in society. 
 
Gradually, theorists started to give attention to how 
classifications and language determined how bodies 
became intelligible in society, which led to the category 
of sex as naturally dimorphic to be problematized (e.g. 
Fausto-Sterling 1993). Simultaneously more metaphysical 
questions started to be asked about the nature of gender. 
Whereas originally many questioned notions of 
femininity without doubting the possibility of essential 
femaleness (Nicholson 2009: 63), under the pressure of 
(secular) poststructuralist theorisation of a constructed 
„self‟ essential conceptualisations became untenable 
(Alcoff 1988; Dietz 2003: 407-408). Not only were both 
sex and gender de-essentialised, but also demarcations 
between sexed bodies and gender were overcome (Gatens 
1983; Butler 1990; 1993). In more recent paradigms the 
aim has been specifically to deconstruct and subvert 
notions of „naturalness‟ and gender categories because 
these are associated with (western) humanist 
essentialisms and therefore suppression of individuality 
(Alcoff 2006: 139-144).  
 
In parallel, post-colonial critiques raised by non-western 
writers and non-white women in the West brought 
attention to a different kind of essentialism: western 
feminist tendencies to universalise women‟s conditions.6 
In the aftermath, feminist theorists steadily adopted more 
nuanced conceptualisations of gender to account better 
for diverse gender systems in the world, becoming 
especially attentive also to race, class, and ethnicity 
differences. This theoretical shift is perhaps best 
exemplified in the concept of intersectionality (tracing 
back to US racial theory), which has been conceived as an 
analytical tool to account for interlocking social divisions 
and their simultaneous impact on individual identities and 
social relations (Yuval-Davis 2006; Berger and Guidroz 
2009).  
 
‘Gender equality’ and ‘empowerment’: Within the 
gender and development field, gender equality has 
generally been conceived on principles of 
samenesssame rights, opportunities, and valuations for 
both men and women (Reeves and Baden 2000: 2; 
Cornwall 2016). Exemplified in the CEDAW document, 
conceptualisations of gender equality take a “universalist 
and non-discriminatory” approach, and aim to penetrate 
all spheres of life (Jabbra 1989: 63). Because gender 
inequalities have been conceived as intrinsic to 
institutions and relations, most writers have emphasised 
the need for transformative empowerment (Batliwala 
1994; Kabeer 1994: 92; Kabeer 1999b; Parpart, Rai and 
Staudt 2003; Kabeer 2011: 5; Cornwall 2016). 
Empowerment can occur at a cognitive, material, or 
structural level, but in recent debates the notion of 
consciousness-raising has been central: it is important that 
women are led to realise their oppression and collective 
power, usually through relational and experience-based 
reflection on deeply internalised beliefs and norms 
(Cornwall 2016). Such notions of empowerment imply 
various assumptions, e.g. that gender relations are 
structurally unequal, that one has reason to suspect the 
current normative framework, and that women‟s 
experiences are key to (re)„imagining‟ women under a 
feminist ideal (Cornwall 2016: 353), pertaining to a 
feminist standpoint epistemology.  
 
An influential conception of empowerment worth 
elaborating further has been proposed by prominent 
writer Naila Kabeer. Drawing from Amartya Sen, Kabeer 
employed the concepts of resources, agency, and 
achievements to define empowerment as both a process 
and aim whereby resources (material, social, human) 
enlarge individuals‟ ability to practise their agency and to 
achieve outcomes of value to them (Kabeer 1999b). For 
Kabeer these three aspects of empowerment are 
interlinked and equally important, and ignoring one or the 
other can lead to misguided or inaccurate conclusions and 
policy-making. She admits, for instance, the difficulty of 
discerning truly empowering achievements and agency in 
light of the fact that individuals are socialised beings and 
internalise to some degree the norms of the societies they 
inhabit. According to Kabeer, in order to distinguish 
gender differentials originating in autonomously defined 
preferences from those resulting from gender inequalities, 
it would be important to examine „achievements‟ in 
combination with the „agency‟ involved. If it were to be 
shown that women practised their agency self reflexively, 
i.e. with critical consciousness about their needs and 
situations, and that their actions resulted somehow in 
subverting inequalities, then one could speak of 
empowerment (ibid.: 441).  
 
Kabeer, like Andrea Cornwall (2016), seems to espouse 
the belief that women who reproduce societal 
expectations will usually do so as a result of the 
combination of deeply internalised values and 
expectations and very restrictive circumstances, which do 
not leave them with many alternative options (see also 
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Kabeer 2011: 526). This restrictive system ultimately 
trains women to create opportunities for themselves in the 
limited ways they can, often reproducing the same 
„patriarchal‟ norms that oppress them, as in the case 
where mother-in-laws abuse their sons‟ wives. The 
„choices‟ these women make in this context cannot be 
considered truly their „own‟ because in effect these are 
shaped by their own oppression and not by autonomously 
defined preference. Furthermore, Kabeer seems to locate 
the subversion of norms and status quo in the very 
meaning of agency, whereby true agentive capacity is 
enforced where subversion of norms is achieved. Her 
theorisation of the Social Relations Framework in 
Reversed Realities seems to underline that powerful 
institutions, such as the state, are structurally gender 
unequal and that change can be triggered when external 
actors (NGOs) can act with some independence from 
these, or when the „oppressed‟ themselves develop a new 
understanding of their conditions, form alliances, and 
develop collective power to cause change (Kabeer 1994). 
 
Articulating the epistemological implications: From this 
brief overview it should be retained that gender 
theorisation has been historically premised on an explicit 
or implicit gender/sex dichotomy, which has been 
understood as one inherently oppressive to women. It 
should also become evident that gender (which in recent 
discourses may incorporate sexuality or subsume sex) is 
conceived as the product of social/discursive processes, 
which means that notions of essential femaleness (or 
maleness) are generally dismissed or not properly 
explored. The new normative of gender equality becomes 
increasingly reminiscent of Gayle Rubin‟s genderless 
society, a society without “obligatory [hetero]sexuality 
and sexual roles” (Rubin 1975: 204). While within gender 
and development such metaphysical implications are 
rarely acknowledged, these follow from the notion of a 
„socially constructed‟ gender, and the normative values 
underpinning empowerment approaches that favour the 
subversion of ideas of „natural‟ gender and gender roles 
conceived on the premise of natural gender traits. I want 
to suggest that such assumptions and directions in 
mainstream gender and development theory reveal the 
prioritisation of secular epistemology and western 
feminist gender metaphysics. 
 
Epistemology has been employed in different ways by 
different writers, including feminist theorists, so it is 
necessary to clarify how I use it. In this paper, 
epistemology defines the criteria and sources for valid 
knowledge as related to a specific cosmology. I agree 
with other writers that epistemology is “linked ultimately 
to worldviews” (Ladson-Billings 2000: 258) under the 
understanding that individuals become conscious agents 
within specific belief systems where they acquire the 
tools and standards for reasoning.
7
  By this I am not 
suggesting that knowledge systems are static, or that 
individuals internalise absolutely the belief systems 
within which they are socialised, or that one cannot be 
exposed to multiple epistemological systems 
simultaneously.
8
 My definition only aims to draw 
attention to the fact that individuals are 
„epistemologically situated‟, and that this situatedness is 
linked to the belief systems individuals espouse and draw 
their validity criteria from. 
 
I want to show that mainstream gender and development 
concepts have been primarily theorised under a secular 
logic, while their normative underpinnings have emanated 
from metaphysics of gender that find primary validity in 
(evolving) western knowledge paradigms of gender. In 
view of my definition of epistemology, I will then suggest 
that this can curtail the ability of current theoretical 
frameworks to make full sense of gender-related 
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours of individuals who 
espouse non-secular/non-western worldviews, with 
subsequent implications for gender and development 
practice. In what follows I attempt to illustrate this 
rationale through a closer look at some theoretical 
underpinnings of the three key concepts. 
 
‘Deconstructing’ mainstream concepts and theories: A 
key theoretical underpinning of „gender‟ discourse within 
this field has been the ubiquitous assumption of structural 
inequalities, especially manifest in conventional tools and 
frameworks of gender analysis and gender planning 
(Overholt et al. 1985; Parker 1993; Moser 1993; Kabeer 
1999a; March, Smyth, and Mukhopadhyay 1999; UNDP 
2001; Mukhopadhyay and Wong 2007: 18). Many of 
these frameworks propose to evaluate gender relations on 
the basis of division of labour, access to resources, or 
distribution of decision-making authority between female 
and male persons. Reflecting earlier feminist theorisations, 
these indicators are predicated for the most part on female 
and male bodies because the practitioner is encouraged to 
analyse gender relations by how the two types of sexed 
bodies divide work, responsibility, and authority. In my 
view, this suggests a disregard for lived gender 
subjectivities (including how sexed-marked individuals 
perceive and treat each other) and a tendency to predicate 
gender inequality on binary anatomies. I believe that 
Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí‟s seminal critique of gender has 
convincingly traced this „bio-logic‟ to western 
epistemologies, demonstrating also the problems of 
transposing it to other societies. Oyěwùmí argued that 
western feminists‟ theorisation of gender inequality on 
the basis of anatomies reflected an inherently western 
mind-body bifurcation and an emphasis on visual 
indicators as opposed to holistic „world-sense.‟ She 
reasoned that if „gender‟ was socially constructed, it 
would need to be theorised on the basis of local 
knowledge systems and realities, which she attempted to 
do for the Oyo-Yorùbá society. As opposed to 
presupposing hierarchical gender relations based on 
dimorphic anatomy, Oyěwùmí analysed social roles at the 
level of language use, lineage rules, the institution of 
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marriage, and the market, and proposed that seniority and 
cosmology-specific beliefs about the genders were most 
prominent contributors to social position and status. 
While her critique was not without considerable flaws,
9
 I 
believe that it insightfully connected epistemology to 
worldviews and gender theory, a relationship that this 
paper aims to articulate further.  
 
Admittedly, gender and development theorists have 
responded to post-colonial critiques by moving toward 
more intersectional analytics. There is no doubt that 
intersectionality has added important layers of complexity 
in gender theory and analysis, but it should be recognised 
that the assumption of structural oppression remains 
foundational (Berger and Guidroz 2009), which can lead 
to cross-cultural, multiplex structures, and relations being 
conceived as a priori hierarchical. Within gender and 
development, in particular, discourses of intersectionality 
usually pertain to multiple “inequalities”, “lines of 
discrimination”, or “identities” that intersect “to produce 
disadvantage” (see for example related Gender and 
Development issue from 2015). However, as some 
feminist theorists have noted, not all divisions need be 
axes of discriminationsome can be cultural differences 
(Harding cited in Yuval-Davis 2006: 199), which means 
that an emphasis on „inequalities‟ would flatten out 
analytical depth. It has yet to be satisfactorily explained 
in gender and development scholarship how differences 
that result from exclusionary practices can be 
distinguished from differences that reflect individual 
preferences grounded in culture-specific worldviews.  
It is not within the mandate of this article to engage 
profoundly with feminist theory of 
intersectionalityonly to outline adaptations in gender 
and developmenthowever, it is important to note that 
very little discussion has engaged with the concept‟s 
epistemological implications. Within the analytic, social 
divisions are generally preconceived (gender, race, and 
class being most potent examples), and these are 
theorised in accordance to how gender, race, and class are 
understood in prominent feminist theories. If such 
metaphysics are embedded in a secular logic (the 
epistemological framework in which academic 
knowledge is made and remade), the cross-cultural 
relevance of the analytic can be questioned. Will these 
social divisions be equally relevant in non-western/non-
secular epistemologies? Will social divisions be theorised 
on the basis of social/material processes alone, or will 
beliefs about the spiritual/invisible realm be equally/more 
salient? While feminist writers agree that intersectional 
analysis must be context-specific, employment of the 
analytic rarely addresses such epistemological concerns.    
Many more gender and development writers have 
departed from historical essentialisms by turning to post-
structuralist deconstructions of „sex‟, advocating for 
gender fluidity as a new normative.
10
 While such 
philosophical directions have provided insightful new 
ways for conceiving the interface of gender subjectivities, 
language, and norms, their epistemological underpinnings 
can be equally problematic abroad. For instance, it is 
rarely recognised that the influential work of Judith 
Butler, increasingly cited in this field, reflects a certain 
feminist worldview that aims to replace ontology-based 
gender metaphysics with a social constructionist one. 
While Butler‟s theorisation of gender as performative 
process opposes a pernicious „biologization‟ paradigm, it 
also conceives gender categories as “always normative, 
and as such, exclusionary” (Butler 1995: 50). This attunes 
to a wider critique of Enlightenment humanism among 
post-modern western feminists, which has tended to 
translate into hostility to notions of „naturalness.‟ It has 
not been recognised, however, that such philosophical 
critiques may be less relevant to cultural contexts that 
have not experienced equally the dogmatic metaphysics 
of Enlightenment and subsequent social sexism. 
 
Furthermore, while a poststructuralist lens has 
insightfully linked gender subjectivation to normative 
gender metaphysics,
11
 it should be considered that its 
politics of deconstruction can be counterproductive in 
contexts where beliefs about gender difference are 
especially powerful and where challenging them might 
cause unhelpful objections. Butler‟s metaphysical 
aetiology of gender performativity has validity in 
mainstream academia because it is grounded in 
knowledge paradigms and validity criteria that are 
accepted/resonate with many western audiences: 
intellectual logic, philosophical syllogism, discourse 
analysis, etc. These same criteria (and thus the gender 
theory produced on their grounds) are not expected to be 
espoused in other knowledge systems to the same length 
because of the dominance of different epistemological 
paradigms that emanate from different worldviews. If, for 
example, some individuals conceive gender based on 
religious beliefs valued within their cosmological system 
(e.g. male and female is the definitive outcome of divine 
intervention), there is a clear incompatibility with a social 
constructionist ideal of gender fluidity. One organisation 
that vigorously opposed CEDAW‟s domestication in 
Nigeria characteristically accused the Bill of promoting 
alternative gender relations and sexualities which 
described as subversive of “traditional Nigerian culture”, 
“family life and motherhood” (Para-Mallam 2006: 39). 
The CEDAW reactions seem to stress the need for finding 
ways to theorise and improve gender relations without 
necessitating a direct challenge of normativities because 
these may be valued locally for reasons not understood by 
a secular logic embedded in mainstream feminist 
metaphysics of gender.  
 
The concept of empowerment may be more adaptable to 
local givens but it does not avoid similarly problematic 
assumptions. As a first observation, concepts of 
empowerment continue to be premised on explicit or 
implicit assumptions of pervasive inequality between 
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social males and social females. In Kabeer‟s theorisation, 
for example, the underlying idea is that the environment 
is defined by structurally unequal social relationships 
within which women‟s consciousness is shaped and 
oppression perpetuated (Kabeer 2011: 503; Kabeer and 
Khan 2014: 5).While it is necessary to employ gender-
sensitive frames when analysing social realities, reducing 
all human relationships to social power can be limiting 
and misguiding. This means that non-intellectualised 
knowledge planes, such as religious beliefs and 
spirituality that may partially shape human perceptions, 
attitudes, behaviour, and relations in some contexts, are 
not considered adequately. Admittedly, it has been 
postulated by Kabeer that the „I‟ is not defined without a 
„we‟ (Kabeer 2011: 503),12but it has not been considered 
that both the „I‟ and the „we‟ are engendered within 
cosmology-specific metaphysics. This conceptual 
repertoire will influence people‟s understanding of 
themselves as gendered, their relations with others and 
the environment, and even, what they will consider 
oppressive or empowering. Current definitions of 
empowerment recognise the power hidden in pre-existing 
normative systems, but they seem to conceptualise 
„power‟ at a certain material/secular plane which I would 
submit obfuscates the multidimensionality and 
intangibility of human experience and socialisation. 
 
I believe that Saba Mahmood‟s (2005) ethnographic study 
of a women‟s piety movement in Cairo, Egypt, highlights 
these sorts of issues. While not denying the 
poststructuralist insight that the pious women she worked 
with were conditioned to the normative expectations 
inherent in their system, Mahmood argued that liberal 
conceptions of agency premised on the binary of norm 
enforcement/subversion were insufficient to explain the 
behavioural patterns she observed. The women seemed to 
be at times critical about aspects of their tradition and 
reflective of their situations, but they also condoned 
Islamic ideals of female piety which they strove to 
achieve in everyday conduct. They repeatedly chose piety 
as their most valued achievement even if this implied 
behaviours mainstream feminist or secular mind-sets 
would not necessarily define as empowering, such as 
veiling or tolerating an „impossible‟ to them husband (i.e. 
one who was not pious). To what extent it would be 
accurate (or helpful) to call these women oppressed is 
debatable, given that their subservience stemmed from 
what seemed to be their own desires emanating from 
within the local cosmological repertoire. Philosophically, 
the case can be made that one “might still be choosing 
autonomously even if she chooses subservience to others 
for its own sake, so long as she has made her choice in 
the right way or coheres appropriately with her 
perspective as a whole” (Friedman 2003: 19). 
 
Epistemological incommensurability and implications 
for gender practice: The previous section attempted to 
illustrate some ways in which foundational concepts are 
linked to western secular metaphysics of gender as these 
evolved over time. I believe that this linkage is important 
to recognise because it suggests a potential for 
epistemological incommensurability when mainstream 
concepts and theories are employed in non-western/non-
secular knowledge systems, with important practical 
implications. What such incommensurability may consist 
in has been illustrated in my view by Richard Eves (2012) 
in an ethnographic analysis of a secular HIV/AIDS 
sensitisation programme among born-again Christians in 
Papua New Guinea. It appears that the „value-free‟ 
language of the HIV/AIDS prevention programme 
ignored the theological framework through which local 
people viewed the disease (as a curse resulting from 
promiscuity), and encouraged them to see sex in amoral 
terms. This was reflected in the slogan „A for Abstinence 
B for Be Faithful and C for Condoms‟ that was used in 
awareness campaigns. For local people, however, 
practising the third (using condoms) was often perceived 
as failing in the first two (abstinence and faithfulness), 
and therefore contradictory to local Christian morality 
(ibid.: 67). As Eves concluded, the rejection of global 
AIDS knowledge was not simply an issue of 
mistranslation or poor communication, but ultimately 
deeper epistemological „dissonance‟: because secular 
programmers valued different knowledge than did local 
Christians, the approach taken did not resonate with the 
audience. Within gender and development, similar 
„dissonance‟ can be discerned in my view in the CEDAW 
domestication process in Nigeria, which was pursued by a 
group of predominantly secular organisations using 
primarily the language of gender equality. The 
conclusions of the RaD study suggested that a better 
engagement with religio-cultural leaders at the 
community level and an adaptation of the Bill‟s language 
to the local religio-cultural sensitivities of women and 
men could have led to a more positive outcome (Para-
Mallam et al. 2011).  
 
Such examples suggest that the epistemological and 
theoretical framework through which development 
practitioners conceive gender (disease or other categories) 
will likely affect how sensitisation programmes are 
planned and implemented. While practitioners have 
consistently employed more participatory and human-
centred research and programme methodologies on the 
ground (Bhasin 1990; Royal Tropical Institute and Oxfam 
1998; Murphy 1999; Mukhopadhyay and Wong 2007; 
Moser 2014), participants have rarely been invited to 
contribute to the theorisation of global concepts in a way 
that will best reflect their own cosmologies and 
epistemologies. Hence, Lina Abu-Habib in an assessment 
of gender trainings delivered in the Macreq/Maghreb 
region found that many participants thought „gender‟ to 
be an alien concept and incompatible with local traditions 
and religious knowledge (Abu-Habib 2007: 49, 55). 
Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay and Franz Wong link such 
objections to the hegemonic, linear, and technical ways in 
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which mainstream development knowledge has been 
conventionally transferred at the local level 
(Mukhopadhyay and Wong 2007: 23). My impression is 
that the problem is not pedagogical only, but ultimately 
the result of epistemological hierarchies and practitioner 
situatedness.  
 
A gender exercise I stood in as a Gender and 
Development student at the UK‟s Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) is worth mentioning because 
it can illustrate well the linkage. For one typical exercise 
the instructor asked participants to attribute a number of 
gender and sex characteristics to the categories „female‟ 
and „male‟ designated on a whiteboard. The aim was to 
lead participants to realise that most of the characteristics 
could not be associated essentially with either, and that 
gender should be conceived preferably as a continuum. In 
the exercise, a few students (including myself) who 
identified with a non-western religious cosmology 
showed signs of discomfort and had trouble thinking 
outside of a binary framework. While problematizing 
stereotypical gender categories resonated with all students, 
the promotion of gender fluidity as factual and normative 
caused distress for some as it disregarded religio-cultural 
beliefs. Should a gender ideal premised on secular logic 
and social constructionist feminist metaphysics have been 
valued over the gender ideals of the individual students 
merely because such was the epistemological framework 
in which knowledge was imparted, which the instructor 
happened to accept as valid? When it is considered that 
gender trainings delivered abroad often employ concepts 
and ideals that are defined by the same secular logic and 
share similar normative underpinnings, such questions 
acquire tremendous ethical and practical urgency.  
 
Another implication that emerges from these examples is 
that objections by non-western actors to gender-related 
programmes may not be always the effect of „patriarchy‟ 
or fundamentalism as some scholars tend to interpret 
(Vaggione 2008; Balchin 2008; AWID 2011; Horn 2012; 
Sandler and Rao 2012), but possibly symptoms of 
cosmological incommensurability exacerbated by the 
introduction of foreign notions and ideals which are 
perceived to be oppositional to local beliefs and values. 
This is an important inference because it suggests that 
gender practitioners might be contributing to such 
objections when they deploy unreflectively mainstream 
knowledge paradigms and ideals cross-culturally, but also 
that some „backlash‟ may be avoided if the same 
practitioners attune more effectively their conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks to locally valued gender 
metaphysics. This ultimately includes beliefs, norms, and 
expectations about gender (including sexuality) that are 
potent within a specific cosmology. To achieve this, it 
may be necessary to suspend theoretical assumptions 
underpinned to mainstream concepts and to aspire to rely 
on local theories of gender as embodied by local 
populations. It should be understood that the issue is not 
whether the practitioner is western or local, but rather 
whether the epistemological lens she/he employs 
emanates from western (mainstream) gender metaphysics 
or local cosmologies and gender beliefs. In my view, only 
analytical and theoretical frameworks that are built with 
local knowledge of gender can point to gender-
sensitization and development approaches that will reflect 
and reason well with local people‟s world views, values, 
and needs. 
 
Conclusion: In this article I submitted that mainstream 
concepts of gender and development have been theorised 
for the most part under a secular logic, and have been 
disproportionately more attuned to western feminist 
gender metaphysics, as these evolved over time to 
influence gender and development discourse. I have 
ventured that the epistemological situatedness of key 
concepts and theories delimits their ability to explain 
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours about gender of 
people in non-secular cosmologies because these do not 
capture fully how religious knowledge and spirituality 
influence some people‟s thoughts and actions in social 
living. Theories of gender equality and empowerment can 
be problematized on similar grounds. How equality and 
empowerment are to be understood will depend to a large 
extent (although not exclusively) on how gender is 
metaphysically conceived in wider knowledge systems 
that have influenced individual socialisation and 
reasoning.  
 
It was proposed that such epistemological 
incompatibilities grounded ultimately in epistemological 
hierarchies may have important implications for gender 
and development practice because interventions will tend 
to be designed on secular thought and ideals, while 
normative frameworks grounded in religio-cultural 
cosmologies may be appraised with suspicion or be 
dismissed as less valid and important. This is because the 
epistemological lens through which gender is theorised is 
predominantly secular as a result of a secular academic 
language and logic that prevails. Therefore, while gender 
practitioners may be epistemologically, socially, and 
culturally differently situated, it is not unlikely that a 
large majority will be conversant with mainstream 
theories of gender and resort to mainstream analytical 
frameworks and ideals for their local gender work.  
 
It is crucial that the theoretical reflections in this article 
be not confused with an argument against gender-
mainstreaming. My aim has been only to propose that the 
current theoretical frameworks may need to be made 
more malleable to account for conceptual and experiential 
planes that western epistemology has been blind to by 
default of its cosmology-conditioned mould. As someone 
socialised in a religious cosmology, I am convinced that 
mainstream concepts can achieve more epistemological 
multidimensionality by suspending or reconsidering some 
of the theoretical assumptions and political ideals that I 
discussed. Ultimately, this critical essay is underpinned 
by my wider criticism of a development paradigm and 
practice that ignores the epistemological frameworks and 
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value systems of the people it aims to understand and to 
benefit.  
 
In my view, a non-biased gender analysis requires 
frameworks of analysis that begin with minimum 
assumptions and can then be theorised bottom to top, 
employing local gender metaphysics. Non-biased gender 
sensitisation programmes, in turn, require the 
understanding of local normative frameworks and values 
so as to identify gender ideals that resonate with the 
material and spiritual priorities of local populations, but 
which can also instigate good change to improve gender 
asymmetries in the valued normative system. Like 
Filomina Steady, I believe that gender analysis should 
aim to incorporate “a historical perspective, a holistic 
perspective, multidimensionality, multiple time frames, 
multiple levels of analysis, multiple identities and 
realities, relational and dynamic contexts, comparative 
methods, oral history, life history and so forth” (2005: 
321), which may grant more insight into complex local 
knowledge and normative systems  
                                                          
1
 The concept of gender, which the Fourth World Conference 
on Women held in Beijing in 1995 helped to mainstream cross-
culturally, drew attention to the structurally hierarchical 
relations of men and women in society and underscored the 
agreement that gender relations needed to be transformed 
(UN 2002: 9). This took the emphasis away from women 
exclusively (what was known as the Women in Development 
Approach-WID) and introduced the current paradigm of 
Gender and Development (GAD) which is concerned with both 
men and women, and specifically their power-laden relations 
at the individual, political, societal, and other analytical levels. 
In this paper I am concerned with the debates that have 
defined this more recent paradigm, but because the latter 
often overlaps with WID I discuss also earlier theoretical 
frameworks and analytical models that appear to have been 
influential within the GAD approach. 
2
 I define cosmology as holistic knowledge system and I use it 
interchangeable with ‘worldviews’ (which in this work 
incorporate both perceptions and senses). A cosmology is 
directly linked to epistemology (valid ways of knowing; see 
below), ontology (ways of being) and ethics (principles 
governing social relations). In this sense, my definition departs 
from a clearly etymological one (κόσμος + λόγος) which would 
emphasise principles governing the cosmos (cosmogony, 
ontology, ways the world operates; see also Kyriakakis 2012: 
135). 
3
 I am thinking here of Bodman and Tohidi 1998; Sweetman 
1998; Bayes and Tohidi 2001; Greany 2006; Vouhé 2007; Meer 
2007; Hoodfar 2007; Tomalin 2011; Tadros 2011; Badran 2011; 
Bradley 2011; DeTemple 2012; and Tomalin 2015. Many more 
studies have been produced on the nexus of gender and 
religion but these emanate primarily from the disciplines of 
anthropology and religious studies. They include ethnographic 
studies that provide in depth discussion of the complex 
intersection of gendered subjectivities and religio-cultural 
socialisation in different knowledge systems (e.g. Boddy 1989, 
Mahmood 2005; Masquelier 2009; Bradley 2011), and studies 
                                                                                                       
that have specifically investigated the role of faith in human 
perceptions and behaviours (Devin and Deneulin 2011). 
4
 How social construction is understood is not always 
articulated explicitly in gender and development writings, but 
it is clear that multiple conceptions are employed. Andrea 
Cornwall seems to suggest that at the level of gender and 
development practice former theorisations are often preferred 
resulting in a superficial focus on ‘constructions’ themselves 
(Cornwall 2007: 72). 
5
 The understanding is that the concept was introduced by 
Robert Stoller, who conducted research with individuals of 
non-normative sexualities or sexed bodies to investigate 
gender development. Stoller used gender to refer to the self-
identifications of transsexuals as women or men (Gatens 1983; 
Mikkola 2016). 
6
 Over-time, mainstream feminist theorisations of gender were 
criticised on multiple grounds, reflecting both post-colonial 
and post-structuralist/post-modern arguments. For instance, 
some writers criticized neo-colonial attitudes of Western 
feminists to universalize their representations of women (and 
men) in the Third World (e.g. Mohanty 1988, Narayan 2004). 
Some women from the South made the point that imperialism 
and colonialism were more salient impediments to them than 
was patriarchy (Ogunyemi in Arndt 2000; Steady 2005: 317-
319). A number of African scholars also mounted critiques 
against feminist portrayals of gender relations as 
monolithically hierarchical in all societies (Amadiume 1987; 
Ogundipe-Leslie 1991 in Masuku 2005; Kolawole 1997; 
Oyěwùmí 1997; Nnaemeka 1998). In parallel, Black feminists in 
the United States worked to bring to attention the intersecting 
structural and political inequalities affecting Black women 
which western feminists theorisation had failed to account for 
(Berger and Guidroz 2009).  
7
 I think that the latest Handbook of Critical and Indigenous 
Methodologies by Denzin, Linkoln and Smith (2008) includes 
contributions that illustrate this effectively. Most contributors 
seem to conceive epistemologies as local systems of 
knowledge or modes of knowing, and show that 
epistemologies need not rely always on Enlightenment reason, 
but can equally be premised on multilogical, 
embodied/experiential and spiritual modes/criteria of 
justification as valued within local cosmologies. 
8
 Individuals can be exposed to multiple epistemological 
systems, and can change their epistemological framework 
throughout their life span as individual consciousness becomes 
shaped and reshaped by human experiences. However, this 
does not cancel out the fact that epistemological systems 
emerge from unique cultural contexts and are intimately 
connected with specific cosmologies. Furthermore, while I 
agree with James Clifford that “culture is contested, temporal, 
and emergent” (Clifford 1986: 19), I would submit that 
epistemological systems are more obstinate to change, 
perhaps because individuals need stronger reasons to question 
the validity criteria that they learned to value in their 
socialisation. My only suggestion is that this primary effect of 
epistemological systems on individual subjectivities deserves 
more attention in the theorisation and analysis of gender 
realities cross-culturally.  
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9
Bibi Bakere-Yusuf has produced a very thorough critique of 
Oyěwùmí’s work that outlines what some of these flaws are. I 
will not repeat them here, but I will note that while Oyěwùmí 
gives us an idea as to why Oyo-Yorùbá cultural and social 
systems do not align with western worldviews, she does not 
give as a full reconstruction of local theories of gender. In my 
view, her work would have achieved more if she had engaged 
with embodied consciousness as much as she did with 
linguistic and institutional analysis. Bakere-Yusuf is right to 
point out that there is a difference between the normative 
framework, and how this is embodied by living people. 
However, it seems to me that Bakere-Yusuf too hastily 
oversees the gist of Oyěwùmí’s argument, which is that 
concepts inevitably emanate from cosmology-specific 
epistemological systems (which, I suggest, are premised on 
unique criteria of validity). Oyěwùmí did not reject the concept 
of gender (evident in her subsequent use of it), but the 
imperial practices of its theorisation. Why should a concept be 
theorised within western metaphysics and experience, and not 
within the gender metaphysics and societal experience of 
other societies? What justifies this double standard? While 
Oyěwùmí could have presented a more thorough gender 
analysis based on the local conceptual repertoire as embodied 
by real people, her argument of epistemological 
incommensurability deserves more contemplation.    
10
 Andrea Cornwall, for example, with reference to Moira 
Gatens’ and Judith Butlers’ works argues against “naturalis*ing+ 
sexual difference through the deployment of gender binaries 
that remain stubbornly tied to the anchor of sex essentialism” 
(Cornwall 2007: 76). Jerker Edström, in a recent IDS 
publication on masculinities, also draws theoretical insights 
from Judith Butler’s gender performativity theory, stating that 
“This helped to clarify the role of relational performativity or 
habitual and structured practices in the social constructions of 
gender (rather than sex explaining the patterns of our habits 
and performances)” (Edström 2014). Although there is no 
room to elaborate the metaphysical implications of Butler’s 
work, is should be recognised that her intention has been 
exactly to subvert ontological notions of gender. 
11
 My argument is not that a poststructuralist framework is 
unhelpful (in fact my article is deeply influenced by Butler’s 
work), but merely that the politics-laden assumptions about 
the universal perniciousness of normative frameworks tend to 
become essentialist and are therefore inappropriate. I would 
argue that a Butlerean gender performativity lens can provide 
unique insights into the relationship between religio-cultural 
norms and gender subjectivities as long as this relationship is 
not preconceived as already monolithically oppressive. 
12
 Here Kabeer draws from Sheila Benhabib’s philosophical 
observation that human beings become within a nexus of 
associations, which ultimately challenges historical asocial 
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